Hi-Drive - 1st Summer School, Porto Heli, Greece

Towards a Quantitative SOTIF Validation of Automated Driving Systems

Lina Putze German Aerospace Center (DLR) e.V. Institute of Systems Engineering for Future Mobility

Lina Putze, Towards a Quantitative SOTIF Validation of Automated Driving Systems, 07.09.2023







To answer this, we...


- (1) study and adjust the ISO 21448's terminological risk framework
- (2) examine the relevant normative and informative parts on <u>SOTIF validation</u> and provide constructive suggestions for improvement




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















































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6



Hazardous Event

'combination of a <u>hazard</u> and an operational situation' [ISO 26262]











event that is a combination of a <u>hazard</u> and a <u>scenario</u> containing conditions in which the <u>hazard</u> can lead to <u>harm</u>

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




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Example of the Terminological Risk Framework







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Relevant clauses within the normative part:

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- Clause 6: Identification and evaluation of hazards
- Clause 7: Identification and evaluation of potential functional insufficiencies and potential triggering conditions



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- Clause 7: Identification and evaluation of potential functional insufficiencies and potential triggering conditions
- Clause 9: Definition of the verification and validation strategy



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- Clause 7: Identification and evaluation of potential functional insufficiencies and potential triggering conditions
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Remark: The normative part of the ISO 21448 is rather sparse with requirements compared to other standards





Clause 6: Identification and evaluation of hazards

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- acceptance criteria must be formulated for SOTIF-related hazardous events
 - both qualitative <u>and</u> quantitative acceptance criteria are permitted
 - quantitative acceptance criteria are exclusively mentioned: GAMAB, PRB, ALARP, MEM



Clause 7: Identification and evaluation of potential functional insufficiencies and potential triggering conditions



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 systematic qualitative or quantitative analysis of potential functional insufficiencies and associated triggering conditions demanded



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- systematic qualitative or quantitative analysis of potential functional insufficiencies and associated triggering conditions demanded
- for scenarios containing identified triggering conditions SOTIF-achievability needs to be demonstrated



Clause 9: Definition of the verification and validation strategy



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validation targets should be derived to argue that the acceptance criteria are fullfilled



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$$A_{H} = R_{HB} \cdot P_{E|HB} \cdot P_{C|E} \cdot P_{S|C}$$



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
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
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- X 1-to-1 relation between hazardous behavior and harm is implicitly assumed


Validation of the SOTIF using Quantitative Acceptance Criteria




Validation of the SOTIF using Quantitative Acceptance Criteria τ В E \mathcal{H} Triggering Condition: Ice plates Harm: Injuries Scenario: Ice existing on truck to persons due plates falling to collision of Hazardous Event: from truck Functional Insuffiice plates with Hazardous Be-Hazard: Inappropriate disciency: Insufficient ADS-operated havior: Not adtance and ice ≻(+ Inappropriate ≻(+ recognition of load vehicle ->iusting distance distance plates falling from of front vehicle Scenario: Vehi-Harm: Injuries truck cle on other lane to persons due Hazard: Hazardous Event: to side collision Inappropriate Functional Insuffi-Hazardous Be-+ Inappropriate evaevasive maneu-Harm Inciency: Insufficient havior: Evasive sive maneuver iuries to ADS-(+ ver evasion maneuver maneuver of and vehicle on operated vehicle Scenario: Ice for falling load ADS other lane occupants due on road and to rolling over Triggering Conshared roadways Hazardous Event: Hazard: dition: Ice plates Swerving with ice Harm: Injuries Dangerous falling from truck on road and not to persons due swerving of structurally divided to collision with vehicle roadways oncoming traffic




 $P(\mathcal{H}) \leq \sum_{\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{T}} P(\mathcal{T}) P(\mathcal{B}|\mathcal{T}) P(\mathcal{E}|\mathcal{B}, \mathcal{T}) P(\mathcal{H}|\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{T})$




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
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
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
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
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Probability of occurrence of a given harm H in combination with a severity level S:


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
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
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
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
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
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
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


Other discretizations are also conceivable, for example:


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	$P(\mathcal{T})$	$P(\mathcal{B} \mathcal{T})$	$P(\mathcal{E} \mathcal{B},\mathcal{T})$	$P(\mathcal{H} \mathcal{E},\mathcal{B},\mathcal{T})$	$P(\mathcal{S} \mathcal{H},\mathcal{E},\mathcal{B},\mathcal{T})$
Traffic Data					
Proving Ground					
Simulation					




	$P(\mathcal{T})$	$P(\mathcal{B} \mathcal{T})$	$P(\mathcal{E} \mathcal{B},\mathcal{T})$	$P(\mathcal{H} \mathcal{E},\mathcal{B},\mathcal{T})$	$P(\mathcal{S} \mathcal{H},\mathcal{E},\mathcal{B},\mathcal{T})$
Traffic Data	×				
Proving Ground	×				
Simulation	×				





Simulation

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	P(7)	P(B T)	$P(\mathcal{E} \mathcal{B},\mathcal{T})$	$P(\mathcal{H} \mathcal{E},\mathcal{B},\mathcal{T})$	$P(\mathcal{S} \mathcal{H}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{T})$	
Traffic Data	×	×	\checkmark			
Proving Ground	×	1	(🗡)			
Simulation	×	1	(🗙)			





Discussion



Discussion



Are there some general rules to derive a suitable decomposition of the risk?

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- Does a scenario-based approach (sufficiently) reduce the validation effort?
- Is a quantitative risk assessment possible before employment?
- How to deal with updates even post employment?



Thank you for the attention.


Contact:

Lina Putze, M.Sc. German Aerospace Center (DLR) e.V. Institute of Systems Engineering for Future Mobility lina.putze@dlr.de




Definition Occurrence






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
Definition Exposure






Definition Exposure






Definition Exposure






Definition Controllability






Definition Controllability






Definition Controllability






Definition Scenario






Definition Scenario






Definition Scenario






Derivation of Validation Targets



Suggestion given in the Annex C.2 of the ISO 21448

Derivation of Validation Targets



- Suggestion given in the Annex C.2 of the ISO 21448
 - Solving the factorization of the acceptance criterion A_H for R_{HB}:

$${m R}_{{m H}{B}} = rac{{m A}_{{m H}}}{{m P}_{{E}|{m H}{B}} \cdot {m P}_{{C}|{E}} \cdot {m P}_{{S}|{C}}}$$

• Estimation of a validation target τ that is sufficient for A_H with confidence level α :

$$au = -\ln(1-lpha)/R_{HB}$$

References



[ISO 21448] International Organization for Standardization, "ISO 21448: Road vehicles – Safety of the intended functionality," 2022.

[ISO 26262] International Organization for Standardization, "ISO 26262: Road vehicles – Functional safety," 2018.

[ISO/IEC Guide 51] International Organization for Standardization, "ISO/IEC Guide 51: Safety aspects — Guidelines for their inclusion in standards," 2014.

[Ulbrich et al.] S. Ulbrich, T. Menzel, A. Reschka, F. Schuldt, and M. Maurer, "Defining and substantiating the terms scene, situation, and scenario for automated driving," in *2015 IEEE 18th international conference on intelligent transportation systems.* IEEE, 2015, pp. 982–988.